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 1. Abstract
It is argued that maladaptive, over-activated self-schema and source-
monitoring failure within depression and anxiety may make an individual 
more prone to the false memory effect. Derived from Beck's cognitive 
theory it was speculated that a possible association with depression, anxiety 
and false memory creation, could be a pathological mechanism to explain 
the development and maintenance of these affective disorders. The 
available literature did not allow strong prediction to be made on the extent 
of false memory creation within depression and anxiety. The main reason is 
that there is few studies that have investigate this questions, and partly 
because the existent results is various. It was expected to replicate the 
mood-congruent effect within depression, though some recent research 
causes some warnings of this effect. In the present study sixty-seven 
participants filled out Beck Depression Inventory-II, Beck Anxiety Inventory, 
Creative Experiences Questionnaire and Dissociative Experience Scale in 
addition to a version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. 
Twenty lists, 10 neutral and 10 depressive-related were presented to 
participants in sequence, following by a recognition task. The words in each 
list were associated with a central but unmentioned theme word that was 
either neutral or depressive-related. The results suggest that anxiety and 
depression is associated to false memory creation, but depression 
correlated only to recognition of neutral critical lures. There was no 
correlation with fantasy proneness in relation to false memories. 
Dissociation was associated with a false memory effect. Clinical and 
empirical implications of these findings and models are further discussed.   
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2. Introduction
Why are some people more susceptible to making errors when they are 
stimulated to create false memories? Researchers around the world have 
contributed to the study, how false memories arise. The very concept of 
false memory underlines the fact that memory is not a literal reproduction 
of the past but instead depends on constructive processes that are 
sometimes prone to errors, distortions, and illusions (Schacter, Norman, & 
Koutstaal, 2000). More importantly, the results have had enormous 
theoretical implications for our understanding of how the mind works, as 
well as practical implications for legal, psychological, and other real life 
settings (Wade, Sharman, Garry, Memon, Mazzoni, Merckelbach & Lofthus, 
2007). False memory research has been criticized many times, specifically 
for misusing the term «false memory», and relying on the wrong 
methodologies to study false memory, and misapplying false memory 
research to real world settings (e.g Freyd & Gleaves, 1996; Pezdek & Lam, 
2007). However, these claims are based on an incomplete coverage of false 
memory literature or mistaken interferences about what the literature 
reveals (see Wade et al., 2007 for review). The real question is not whether 
or not research into false memories has been misguided, but how natural 
occurring variables act to increase or decrease the probability of false 
memory creation. 
There is growing evidence that the tendency to exhibit false memories 
varies as a function of individual differences (Roediger & McDermott, 2000). 
However, there are still only a few studies that address these issues. Most 
research on individual differences has focused on traits such as dissociation 
(e.g. Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998; Wright, Startup, & Mathews, 2005), 
fantasy proneness (e.g. Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, & 
Merckelbach, 2005; Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen, & Wessel, 
2004), suggestibility (e.g. Kassin, 1997) and absorption (e.g. Drivdahl & 
Zaragoza, 2001). 
5
False memory creation is associated with failures in source monitoring; the 
process of remembering how, when and where memories were acquired. 
Curiosity enough, a considerable body of evidence has indicated that people 
with depressive symptoms suffer from substantial memory impairment (for 
review see Veiel, 1997), but still, few studies have investigated source 
monitoring with depressive individuals. Focus in research of depression has 
instead been on e.g. attentional deficits, lack of motivation and impaired 
cognitive initiative (Ellis & Moore, 1999). 
Since depression has received little attention in prior research on individual 
differences in false memories, we do not know whether depression make 
individuals prone to false memories or not. However, it is well documented 
that depression is related to memory impairment. One of the most 
influential theories of depression and anxiety, Beck's cognitive theory, 
postulates that both anxiety and depression are characterized by systematic 
distortions in information processing. To understand the distortions seen in 
anxiety and depression, Beck's employs the construct of schema. Self-
schema is organized representation of prior knowledge which guides the 
current processing of information (e.g., Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999). An over- 
activation of certain maladaptive schema is thought to be characteristics for 
both anxiety and depression, and lead to a greater degree of perceptual 
sensitivity and memory bias for information congruent with one's 
predominant self-schema (Mineka & Nugent, 1995).  
In general, Beck's cognitive theory, argues that distortions in thinking and 
memory is the cause of depressive and anxiety symptoms, rather than visa 
versa. A review of the empirical literature by Clark et al. (1999), supports 
the idea that negative cognitive organization plays a important role in 
development of a depressive experience. In the present study, we examine 
the hypothesis that individuals with depression or anxiety have deficits in 
source monitoring, resulting in increased likelihood of false memories. If 
depression or anxiety is associated with false memories, this may be an 
important pathogenetic factor for depressive/anxiety episodes due to 
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mechanism underlying depression, anxiety and source-monitoring failure. 
Though there has been few studies exploring depression and source-
monitoring, even fewer has studied anxiety and false memory effect. 
There is a final point that needs to be made at the outset. Ideally the 
present study should focus on both depression and anxiety, but it would not 
be fruitful to attempt to cover both here. There are several reasons for this, 
but the main one is that the coverage would be very brief. Accordingly, the 
main focus will be primarily on depression.  
2.1 Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm
As a first step toward addressing the issues just raised, one paradigm that 
has been used to study false memories, including errors in source 
monitoring, is the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure. This is a 
well known paradigm and an effective and ethical method for eliciting false 
memories. In this paradigm, participants try to remember list of words, with 
the members of each list being associatively related to an non-presented 
target word, the so-called «critical lure» (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). For example, participants may study words like bed, 
rest, awake, tired that is strongly related to the nonpresented critical lure, 
sleep. Several studies have shown that the probability of falsely recognize 
nonstudied critical items is often similar to or sometimes higher than the 
probability of correctly recognizing associates that were actually presented 
in the studied DRM lists (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Schacter et al., 
2000). Moreover, studies have also revealed that warning participants about 
the presence of semantically related lure words in the recognition test can 
produce modest reductions in the level of false recognition (Gallo, Roberts, 
& Seamon, 1997; McDermott & Roediger, 1998). In addition, there is 
research showing that encoding conditions at study affect levels of false 
memory, such as presentation duration (McDermott & Watson, 2001), 
presentation modality (Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001), and 
levels of processing (Thapar & McDermott, 2001). 
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DRM paradigm has been criticized by Freyd & Gleaves (1996) for the 
relevance of the DRM paradigm to real world examples of alleged false 
memories. Especially since occurrence of false memories typically involve 
highly emotional events, whereas words used in the DRM paradigm are not 
emotionally charged. In particular, Freyd and Gleaves pointed out, the 
frequency of false recall and recognition in the DRM paradigm would be 
lowered when trauma-related items would be used, due to their emotional 
distinctiveness. Geraerts et al. (2005) was the first to investigate this issue 
by employing neutral and trauma-related DRM lists to traumatized 
individuals. They found that woman with recovered memories of child sexual 
abuse exhibited higher rates of false recall and false recognition for both 
neutral and trauma-related critical lures, although the effect was smaller for 
the trauma-related critical lures.  
2.2 Theories of False Memory Effect
There are several theories that explain false memory in the DRM task. 
According to the fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Brainerd, 
Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001) both a verbatim representation of the 
surface form and a gist representation of the meaning of a word list are 
formed at the time of encoding. False recall or recognition on the DRM task 
occurs via the gist representation because the gist trace result in a sense of 
familiarity for the critical lure, and the individual incorrectly ascribes this to 
having studied the word previously.
It is also possible to explain false recognition as a result from failure of 
pattern separation: studying numerous semantically related words might 
result in unacceptably high levels of overlap between item representations 
(Schacter et al., 2000). Pattern separation failure leads to impaired recall of 
distinctive, item-specific information, but excellent memory for what the 
items have in common (Schacter et al., 2000). 
The two process Activation/Monitoring theory (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) 
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assumes that the presentation of the associate words indirectly activates 
the representations in memory corresponding to related words such as the 
critical lures (either automatically or strategically, through implicit 
associative responses). In the recognition test, false memory for the critical 
lures possibly occur when source monitoring fails, that is, when people 
misattribute the source of the indirect activation of the nonstudied critical 
lure to the direct activation that would have been produced if it had been 
studied. Findings show that false recognition effect were larger when 
semantic associates related to a particular theme word were all presented 
consecutively (in blocks) than when associates of different theme words 
were intermixed (Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997), this is consistent with 
both source monitoring failure and pattern separation failure. Source 
monitoring is particularly relevant for the current research, so we deepen 
this more with a closer look at source monitoring and how we may fail at 
this.  
2.2.1 Source Monitoring Framework
One of the most interesting theories that memory distortions can be 
understood within, is the source monitoring framework (SMF, Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). Within this model, SMF 
assumes that memories are constructed from perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, 
and goals active together at the time (Johnson & Raye, 2000). Thus, errors 
can be introduced when a memory is first acquired and anytime thereafter 
when it is activated and when it is evaluated (Johnson & Raye, 2000). First, 
episodes need to be stored in a manner that allows them to be accessed 
separately at test, and retrieval cues need to be specific enough to activate 
only a single episode (Schacter et al., 2000). Poor memories for 
differentiating or source-specifying details occur when these conditions are 
not met, and multiple episodes are accessed and details that differ from 
episode to episode will compete (Schacter et al., 2000). Decision making 
and criterion setting are then needed to evaluate whether it pertains the 
target episode (Schacter et al., 2000). This means that constituent features 
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of a memory representation are distributed widely across different parts of 
the brain, therefore will no single location contains a complete record of a 
trace of a specific experience (Squire, 1992). When retrieving a past 
experience this will involve a process of pattern completion, where a subset 
of the features composing a particular past experience are reactivated, and 
activation spreads to the rest of the constituent features of that experience ( 
Schacter et al, 2000).    
Remembering the source of the memory accurately is important to decide 
whether it is credible or not (is this a memory of a dream or a real event?). 
Since source monitoring is important when judging the likelihood or 
credibility of a memory, individuals with deficits in source monitoring will be 
prone to false memories (Johnson & Raye, 2000). When people are source 
monitoring, this is as explained based upon certain features of the memory, 
e.g., perceptual, temporal, and semantic (Johnson & Raye, 2000). If features 
of an event are poorly bound to other features during initial encoding or not 
consolidated afterwards, these inadequate binding can result in source 
monitoring failure, in which people retrieve fragments of an episode but are 
unable to recollect how or when the fragment were acquired (Johnson and 
Chalfonte, 1994). Another way source monitoring may occur is when binding 
processes are unimpaired, but not enough information that is diagnostic of 
the item's source is included in the bound representation (Schacter et al., 
2000). A particular interesting factor for the current study, that can affect 
the extent to which other features are bound together during encoding or 
subsequent thinking about events, is emotion (Johnson & Raye, 2000). For 
example in depression, rumination may cause a polluted input that will 
affect plausibility and consistency checks under heuristic and systematic 
evaluation (Johnson & Raye, 2000). Similarly, emotional focus may produce 
memory deficits by increasing the chances that elaborations, 
interpretations, or constructions take place, thus increasing the chances for 
later source confusing (Johnson & Raye, 2000). The types of information we 
expect or require will vary depending upon our motives and expectations. 
How we may be more or less specific in the information we use to evaluate 
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the source, and therefore the accuracy of a reactivated memory, can be 
affected of several factors, like self-schema. 
2.2.2 Self – Schemas and False Memory Creation
«Self-schemas» are the compilations of past experiences that influence 
current evaluations (Schacter, 2001). Built up over time, self-schemas 
contain evaluative knowledge of our own characteristics (Schacter, 2001). 
Beck postulate that both depression and anxiety are characterized by 
systematic distortions in information processing and schema is a construct 
to understand the distortions seen in anxiety and depression (Mineka & 
Nugent, 1995). The characteristic for both disorders is an over activation of 
certain maladaptive self-schema (Mineka & Nugent, 1995). Hence, the two 
emotional disorders are thought to differ regarding the content of the 
maladaptive self-schema (Mineka & Nugent, 1995). The theory postulates 
that negative self-schema are central to depression, while danger schemas 
are characteristic of anxiety. Therefore, individuals with negative self-
schema will attend to and remember more negative information, which will 
lead to and maintain negative affect and depression. Individuals with highly 
active danger schema will attend to and remember more threatening 
stimuli, which will lead to and maintain anxiety. For example, a highly 
negative self-schema can easily lead to depression; result in chronic 
negative and inadequate beliefs of oneself, other people and the world 
(Schacter, 2001; Clark et al, 1999). Therefore, a negative self-schema 
provides a rich network of knowledge that facilitates encoding and later 
retention of negative experiences (Schacter, 2001). Thus, individuals with 
depressive symptoms may use their emotional state to judge the likelihood 
of a memory, and then give more credence to information that matches 
their depressive state. When individuals fail at source monitoring, this 
increases the probability of accepting images, fantasies, or other internally 
generated information as evidence of external events that never happen 
(Schacter et al., 2000). One could expect that depressive individuals would 
be more prone to false memory, and susceptible to falsely believe that a sad 
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or traumatic event happened to them.
2.3 Mood-Congruency Effect
A related question, which is one focus of the present study, is whether 
individuals with depressive symptoms also shown an enhance number of 
recognition of depression-related words. Cognitive research has shown that 
participants with depression share a pronounced bias to recall or recognize 
negative-valence or depression-related material more efficiently than 
controls (Moritz, Glascher, & Brassen, 2005; Schacter, 2001). The tendency 
to think negatively can facilitate the deliberate remembering of the same 
conceptual, negative material in a experiment (Hertel, 2004). 
In contrast to research on mood-congruency effect in depression, mostly all 
research on mood congruency effect in anxiety has proven surprisingly 
negative (e.g., Nugent & Mineka, 1994; Becker, Roth, Andrich, & Margraf, 
1999). When significant findings have been obtained, they have often failed 
to be replicated (Mineka & Nugent, 1995).  One explanation may be, that 
although anxious individuals worries about future events, there is little 
evidence to suggest that they habitually ruminate about their own negative 
qualities (in contrast to depression), so there is no compelling reason to 
expect anxious individuals to display a negative recall bias following such 
commonly used self-referential encoding procedures (e.g., Mogg, Mathews, 
& Weinman, 1989). 
There are several theoretical frameworks that emphasize the greater degree 
of conceptual processing that depressed people devote to negative 
materials. Some approaches propose that elaborative conceptual processing 
facilitates recall by establishing richer and more diverse retrieval routes 
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). The framework of transfer-
appropriate processing (Roediger & McDermott, 1992) explains mood-
congruent recall as established by the match between conceptual 
elaboration during initial task and the conceptual basis of the attempt to 
12
remember. Under this account includes prior habits of thinking (Hertel, 
2004), like this, negative self-referential materials come to mind with 
greater fluency, either during the initial episode to be remembered, during 
the test itself, or on both occasions. 
Depressed individuals endorse more negative than positive words, whereas 
emotional healthy people tend to endorse more positive than negative 
words (Schacter, 2001). The existence of a mood-congruency effect is 
widely accepted in the literature, also because it provides a framework for 
explaining the emergence and maintenance of mood disturbances (Moritz et 
al., 2005). However, several recent studies have not been able to confirm 
the mood-congruency effect (Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Banos et al., 2001; 
Moritz et al, 2005).  
2.4 Empirical Findings of False Memory Effect in Relation to 
Depressive Individuals
There are basically three types of study within this field: those which involve 
naturally occurring mood in clinically depressed individuals; those which 
involve naturally occurring mood in sub-clinical populations and those which 
involve some form of mood induction. Depression is here referred to both 
diagnostic categories and the self-reported state of dysphoria. «Dysphoria» 
is used to denote undiagnosed negative affect that for example produces 
moderate to high scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, 
Steer and Brown, 1996). In the literature, few studies have investigated 
whether depression is related to false memories (mood-congruent false 
recognition/intrusions). An early study (Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & 
Fuller, 1992) showed that depressed patients exhibited the expected mood-
congruent effect for studied items, but healthy participants display a 
stronger bias to produce negative-valence false recognition. Another study 
(Murray, Whitehouse, & Alloy, 1999) either did not find any differences 
between dysphoric and nondepressed participants regarding false memory. 
In the literature, the last study was Moritz et al., (2005) investigation of 
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mood-congruent false and true memory recognition in depression. Like the 
present study they used a variant of the DRM procedure, but only with four 
lists that was either depression-relevant (i.e., loneliness), delusion-relevant 
(i.e., betrayal), positive (i.e., holidays), or neutral (i.e., window). The results 
showed no significant association between depressive participants and false 
memory effect.  
In the trauma literature, Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidzic (in press) 
investigated trauma-related and neutral false memories in war-induced Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Like Geraerts et al. (2005), Brennen et al. 
utilized the DRM procedure with both neutral and trauma-related words. 
Trauma-exposed participants with and without PTSD recall equal numbers of 
neutral critical lures, but PTSD patients were more susceptible to recall war-
related critical lures. Interestingly, for the current research, was that 
Brennen et al. found a significant correlation between BDI and critical lure 
production. Measures of trauma exposures were worse predictors than the 
BDI score, which suggest that depression rather than PTSD seems to be 
more strongly related to recall of critical lures and studied words, for both 
word types. In other words, depression may increase the susceptibility to 
production of false memories. The results are interesting in the light of other 
findings from PTSD, where Zoellner, Foa, Brigidi, & Przeworski (2000) found 
that false recall was related to trait anxiety and PTSD severity. They used 
the DRM task to compare individuals with PTSD to traumatized individuals 
without PTSD and nontraumatized controls. In Zoellners et al., study only 
the original DRM lists (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) were 
used. 
2.4.1 Mood Induction Research
Many studies performed with experimental mood inductions (e.g. through 
sad or happy music) is an effort to make causal statements about mood and 
memory (Hertel, 2004). The language of depression is in some of these 
studies used to describe the findings from negatively valence inductions 
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(Hertel, 2004). Since mood induction studies sometimes reveal patterns 
similar to those in studies based on self-reports or diagnoses, this is of 
interest for the present study.
Storbeck and Clore (2005) investigated with DRM procedure how affective 
states might influence false memory effect by manipulating individuals into 
either negative or positive mood. Individuals in negative moods were 
significantly less likely to show false memory effect than those in positive 
moods or those in whom mood was not manipulated. This is consistent with 
the predictions that were based on the affect-as-information hypothesis 
(Clore et al., 2001; Storbeck & Clore, 2005); if positive moods encourage 
relational processing, then critical lures should be more likely to come to 
mind to people in positive moods. If negative moods encourage item-
specific processing, then such lures should be less likely to come to mind to 
people in negative moods, because item-specific processing tends to occur 
at the expense of relational processing.
Relational processing and item-specific processing is two ways to 
accomplished encoding. Relational processing involves encoding items in 
relation to other concepts in memory (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Item-specific 
processing involves encoding items by their features, elements, and 
distinctive qualities (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Storbeck and Clore (2005) 
based their predictions on that individuals in positive moods see 
connections, focus on global rather than local aspects of what they see, and 
process incoming information in relation to currently accessible concepts 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). In contrast, individuals in negative mood resist the 
influence of accessible scripts and stereotypes; focus on local rather than 
global aspects of what they see, and generally process incoming information 
independently of currently accessible concepts (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). 
Their result was consistent with their predictions; individuals in negative 
moods were significantly less likely to show false memory effect than those 
in positive mood or those whose mood was not manipulated. So, positive 
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moods gave the same results as neutral mood, so their findings primarily 
reflect the impact of negative affect on the false memory effect. Storbeck & 
Clore (2005) also provide evidence that mood influenced the accessibility of 
lures at encoding, rather than influencing monitoring at retrieval of whether 
lures were actually presented. 
Wright et al. (2005) also examined negative mood in relation to false 
memories by manipulating mood and using the DRM procedure. They also 
compared the amount of false memories with dissociation. They found that 
mood was related to false memories, but it was dependent on the specific 
task demands. Participants in negative mood were less likely than those in 
positive moods to have false memory, when they were told to recall as 
many words as they felt like recalling. When they were told to recall as 
many words as they could, participants in negative mood had more false 
memories. Dissociation was not associated with false memories. Wright et 
al. (2005) explain their results by the mood-as-input hypothesis. If people 
are told to recall as many items as they can, then they have to judge how 
many they have recalled and if they are satisfied with this. Wright et al. 
(2005) argues that people in negative mood will interpret their mood as 
meaning that they are not satisfied with the performance and continue 
trying to recall words. For those in the positive mood will the opposite be 
true, they will interpret positive mood to mean they are satisfied with their 
performance and finish. 
These various empirical results show that how affective states might 
influence false memory effect is up to this date unsure. 
2.5 Personality Characteristics Related to False Memory Effect
Over the past years, several studies have looked at how personality 
characteristics relates to false memory effect with unequal results. For 
example, Geraerts et al. (2005) found that fantasy proneness was related to 
false recall and false recognition. In contrast, fantasy proneness has in 
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another study been related to superior recognition performance 
(Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004).  Dissociation 
is also an individual difference variable that has been tested. Winograd, 
Peluso, and Clover (1998) showed that self-reports of high degrees of 
dissociative experiences correlated with enhanced false recall and false 
recognition. Curiously enough, Wright et al. (2005) found that dissociation 
was not associated with false memories. In distance to these results, this 
current study will in addition to depression and anxiety look upon fantasy 
proneness and dissociation in relation to false memory creation. 
2.6 Hypothesis
In the present study, neutral- and depression-related DRM lists were used to 
investigate whether participants who had higher scores on the individual 
variables we tested, displayed higher rates of false recognition for neutral 
and depression-related critical lures relative to other participants. More 
specifically, are individual differences in depression, anxiety, fantasy 
proneness and dissociation connected to false recognition in the DRM task? 
Based on recently studies as outlined before, no clear predictions can be 
made concerning the extent of false recognitions and depression. By using 
depressive-related DRM lists we also could investigate the mood-congruency 
effect. Though some recently studies call for some caution regarding mood-
congruent bias, it was hypothesized that participants with depressive 
symptoms should recognize more mood-congruent words (i.e., depression-
relevant words). 
3. Method
3.1 Participants 
Sixty seven participants (45 women and 22 men, mean age 26,6, SD = 8,1) 
from the University of Oslo volunteered to take part in the experiment. They 
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were recruited via oral advertisement for the research at lectures in 
psychology, advertisement on the internet or posters at campus. 
Participants included undergraduates and employees. They were asked to 
fill out several questionnaires and to accomplish a cognitive task. They were 
not informed about the specific hypothesis being tested. First, participants 
filled out BDI-II, BAI, CEQ and DES. In the end of the session, participants 
completed a DRM task. All participants gave informed consent to participate 
and were told that they could withdraw from the experiment at any point.
 
3.2 Materials
The following four questionnaires were administered in pencil-and-paper 
form in the order given below.
3.2.1 Dissociative Experience Scale
The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; 
Carlson & Putnam, 1993) is a 28-item, self-administered questionnaire 
measuring tendency toward dissociative phenomena (e.g., feelings of 
derealization, depersonalization, and disturbances in memory). Some items 
relate to common dissociative experiences (e.g., driving and not recalling 
the trip), whereas others relate to more severe dissociative experiences 
(e.g., out-of-body experiences). Participants were asked to place a cross in a 
box that indicated what percentage of the time this happens to them, 
ranging from 0% to 100% at 10% intervals. The DES yields a single score of 
degree of dissociation and its reliability, internal consistency, and construct 
validity have been demonstrated (Porter, Birt, Yuille, & Lehman, 2000). DES 
is designed for non-clinical samples (Wright & Lofthus, 1999), but in clinical 
contexts, a DES score of 30 or greater suggest the presence of a 
dissociative disorder (Bernstein & Putman, 1986; Porter et al., 2000). 
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3.2.2 Beck Depression Inventory -II
All participants filled out Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer and 
Brown, 1996). BDI-II is a reliable and widely used self-rating questionnaire 
consisting of 21 items that assess the levels of depressive symptoms 
present in the past 2 weeks (Beck et al., 1996).  This new revised edition 
replaces the BDI and the BDI-1. Examples items are: “I am so sad and 
unhappy that I can't bear it anymore” and “I have totally lost interest in 
other people or thing”. There is a 4-point scale where the items are scored 
(range 0-3) and scores are summed to obtain a total score, with higher score 
reflecting higher levels of depressive symptoms (Horselenberg et al., 2004). 
Total score of 0-13 is considered minimal range, 14-19 is mild, 20-28 is 
moderate, and 29-63 is severe.
3.2.3 Beck Anxiety Inventory
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) is a brief self-rating 
questionnaire designed to measure symptoms of anxiety which are 
minimally shared with those of depression. 21 items represents an anxiety 
symptom that is rated for severity on a 4-point Likert scale (0-3), ranging 
from Not at all to Severely; I could barely stand it. The participants were 
instructed to range how much they had been bothered by each symptom 
during the last week, including today. Total score of 0-7 is considered as 
minimal range, 8-15 is mild, 16-25 is moderate, and 26-63 is severe. 
3.2.4 Creative Experiences Questionnaire
The Creative Experiences Questionnaire is a 25-item yes/no index of fantasy 
proneness. Wilson and Barber (1982) provided CEQ items derived from the 
extensive case descriptions of fantasy proneness. Typical CEQ-items are: «In 
general, I spend at least half of the day fantasizing or daydreaming» and 
«My fantasies are so vivid that they are like a good movie». 'Yes' answers 
are summed to yield a total CEQ score with higher scores indicating higher 
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levels of fantasy proneness. CEQ possesses adequate reliability in terms of 
internal consistency and test-retest stability (Merkelbach, Horselenberg, & 
Muris, 2001).
3.3 A Version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott Procedure
The cognitive task was based on the procedure developed by Deese-
Roediger-McDermott (DRM), which has frequently been used for examining 
false memories since those authors showed that people will falsely report 
hearing a word if they are presented with semantically related words 
(Deese, 1959, Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The procedure involves 
presenting an lists of words; the words on each list are highly associated 
with a single, non presented word, referred to as a critical lure (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Roediger and McDermott's material were used as a 
template for making neutral and depressive DRM lists in Norwegian. 10 
neutral lists were generated using the principle that the lists were composed 
of 10 words presumed to be most strongly associated to the critical lure. 
Similarly, 10 depression-related critical lures were chosen and lists 
generated. All lists were tested on pilot participants, and some lists were 
adjusted or replaced to increase the production of critical lure. The final 
stimulus material is presented in Appendix. 
The DRM task was run in three phases; a study phase, some Raven's 
matrices as filler task, followed by a recognition test. The two latter had no 
time limit. The study phase contained 20 lists (10 neutral and 10 
depression-related) presented on a computer screen. The lists of words were 
presented sequentially with no delay between words. The second task was a 
filler IQ test. The third a recognition test consisted of 120 words; 60 (30 
depressive-related and 30 neutral) had been presented in the study phase 
and obtained by selecting items on serial positions 1, 8 and 10 from each 
studied list. Each critical lure items (20 words) were presented and also 20 
words weakly related to each list and 20 words unrelated to any words on 
the list. The items were randomly presented by an E-Run Prime script. In 
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total, 7 participants took part in piloting procedure. By using the Oslo 
Corpus (http://www.tekstlab.uio.no), which contains 18.5 million words, it 
was established that the mean word frequency was 573,1 (SD=260,52) for 
the depression-related critical lures, and 454,7 (SD=393,93) for the non-
depression related, 
t(18)<1, ns. The mean word length was 5,9 (SD=1,66) and 4,8 (SD=1,14) 
letters, respectively, t(18)<1, ns. 
3.4 Design and Procedure
All participants were initially told that this was a study designed to test how 
individual differences influence our memory. Participants completed the 
questionnaires and the DRM procedure and were then given an scratch card 
worth 25 NOK. All participants were tested individually during a session that 
lasted for 1 hour. 
The experiment involved a within-subjects design, with the independent 
variables of Wordtypes (levels of Critical Lure, New, Old) and Valence (levels 
of Depression and Neutral). Participants were given oral and written 
instructions that they would see several word lists on a computer screen, 
and that it was important to   concentrate and to be attentive. They were 
told that their memory for these word lists would be tested afterwards. List 
items were presented with the strongest associates occurring first, at a rate 
of 1500 msec per item. Between each list there was a page that only 
showed «-». The second part of this study was a filler task, an IQ test, where 
the participants were told to find the correct missing part (8 alternatives) of 
a pattern. The third and last part of the study was the recognition test. The 
participants were instructed that they would be presented with several 
words, one at a time, and that some of these words had been presented in 
the first task. The word would remain on the screen until they made their 
decision. They were told to decide whether each word was «old», i.e. which 
they had seen previously during list presentation or «new» i.e. that had not 
previously presented. 
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For obtaining the participants judgments about their phenomenological 
experience while recognizing non presented items, we used a well-known 
procedure where participants distinguished between two states of 
awareness from the past: remembering and knowing (Tulving, 1985; in 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The participants were told to make an 
additional judgment for each item judged to be old: whether they 
Remember or Know that the item occurred in the study list. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) defined a Remember experience as one in which the 
subject can mentally relive the experience. When participants are confident 
that the item occurred on the list but unable to reexperience (i.e., 
remember) its occurrence, this is defined as a Know judgment. If the 
participants were able to recollect something specific from the moment they 
saw the word during the list presentation, they should assign a Remember 
judgment to the test word. If they were unable to recollect its exact moment 
of occurrence, but knew that the word had been on the list, they should 
assign it as a Know judgment. If the participants were insecure whether the 
word had been presented before or not, this was instructed to be a Guess 
judgment. All instructions were explained in detail by the experimenter, as 
well as on the screen. 
4. Results
First, we look at the individual variables (BDI, BAI, CEQ and DES) and the 
number of false recognitions on the DRM task. The percentage of 
recognition (Remember/Know responses for critical lures, both depressive 
and neutral) served as the dependent variable. Correct recognition (i.e., 
mean proportion of recognition of studied words), false recognition of critical 
lures and nonstudied words other than the critical lures, were tested. Results 
computed that all participants performed satisfying rates of correct 
recognition. Overall, studied words were recognized at a rate of xx%. 
Finally, we examine the mood-congruency effect.
22
4.1 Self-Report Scores and False Recognition Rate
Table 1 show the scores obtained on the various questionnaires for 
measuring depression, anxiety, fantasy proneness and dissociation. The 
data in Table 1 also presents the proportion of false recognition on the 
depression-related and neutral critical lures. 
  Table 1
 Psychometric data of BDI, BAI, CEQ, DES, and depression-related and neutral
 critical lures.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Depression-
related lures
                        1                       10                      3,7                      2,4
Neutral lures                         1                       11                      4,7                      2,6
BDI                         0                       33                      9,6                      7,3
BAI                         0                       40                      8,8                      8,4
CEQ                         0                       17                      8,3                      3,7
DES                      .95                    55,4                    12,6                      8,6
4.2 False Recognition of Depression-Related and Neutral Lures
To test whether participants with higher scores on BDI, BAI, CEQ and DES 
displayed higher levels of false recognition on the DRM task, we computed 
the false recognition rate (false recognition of neutral and depression-
related critical lures). Table 2 shows Pearson correlations between false 
alarms for critical lures, depression, anxiety, fantasy proneness and 
dissociation. As can be read in Table 2, only BAI score correlated significantly 
with the number of depression-related and neutral critical lures, whereas 
BDI only correlated significantly with the numbers of neutral critical lures. 
Pearson correlations between the BDI, BAI, CEQ and DES and the cognitive 
measures gave the following pattern: BAI scores correlated positively with 
the production of depression-related and neutral critical lures, r = .24, and r 
= .21, respectively, ps < .05. Scores on BDI correlated non- significantly 
with the production of depression-related critical lures, r = .19, and 
positively for neutral, r = .27, respectively, ps < .05. CEQ scores correlated 
non-significantly with the production of critical lures; for depression-related, 
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r = .03, and for neutral, r = .02. Scores on DES correlated non-significantly 
with depression-related critical lures, r = .17, but positively with neutral, r = 
.27, ps < .05.
   Table 2
Pearson product-moment correlations between depression (BDI), anxiety (BAI), 
fantasy proneness (CEQ), dissociative symptoms (DES), and false recognition on 
depression-related critical lures, neutral critical lures and depression/neutral lures.
BDI 
n = 67
BAI 
n = 67
CEQ
 n = 66
DES
 n= 67
Depression-
related lures
 .196 .245* .034 .176
Neutral lures .270* .217* .022 .275*
Depression/ne
utral lures
.262* .257* .031 .254*
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
   Table 3
Pearson product-moment correlations between depression (BDI), anxiety (BAI), 
fantasy proneness (CEQ), dissociative symptoms (DES), and correct recognition on 
depression-related studied words, neutral studied words.
BDI 
n = 67
BAI 
n = 67
CEQ
 n = 66
DES
 n= 67
Depression-
related studied 
words
 -.016 -.047 .035 .158
Neutral 
studied words
.196 .285* .076 .082
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
4.3 Recognition Accuracy
Pearson correlations between correct recognition (Remember/Know 
responses) for depression-relevant- and neutral studied words and the 
individual difference measures (BDI, BAI, CEQ and DES) were calculated (see 
table 3). There were no relation between higher scores on BDI and more 
correct recognition for depression-relevant studied words. It appeared that 
anxiety (BAI) was related, but only to neutral studied words. 
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5. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine whether high scores on 
depression, anxiety, fantasy proneness and dissociation would show 
enhanced false recognition on neutral and depressive-related critical lures in 
the DRM paradigm. Our result replicate the robust false recognition effects 
typically found with the DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
To our surprise, the results revealed that only anxiety (BAI) correlated with 
false recognition for both neutral and depressive-related critical lures. 
Depression (BDI) only correlated with false recognition for the neutral critical 
lures, thus no significant correlation with depressive-related critical lures. 
Although, the anxiety results were not very surprising considering that 
previous research (Zoellner et al, 2000) has linked anxiety to the false 
memory effect. The present result for depression was in line with the various 
results of depression and the false memory effect. 
We found no evidence for fantasy proneness and false memory creation. 
Dissociation correlated positively with the false memory effect, a finding 
that fit well with results from several other studies (Hyman & Billings, 1998; 
Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998; Winograd et al. 1998; Clancy, Schacter, McNally, 
& Pitman, 2000). Similarity to more recent research, we found no 
statistically significant better memory for depression-related words with 
dysphoria, thus no mood-congruency effect. Instead, the results revealed 
that anxious participants remembered significant better neutral words.   
The present results for depression and anxiety in association to the false 
memory effect; the effect of co-existing depression and anxiety; and in the 
end, depression- and anxiety mood-congruency effect, is further discussed.
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5.1 Depression and the False Memory Effect
As noted, depression correlated only to neutral critical lures and not with 
depressive-related. Since anxiety correlated with depressive-related critical 
lures the absence of false recognition for depression is of special interest. 
5.1.1 Absence of False Recognition on the Depressive-Related DRM lists
The DRM lists which was derived for the current research was perhaps not 
so depressive-related after all. In addition, not all depressive-related words 
captured the same mood. BDI correlated with neutral critical lures, but those 
may have been more self-referential than the depressive-related lists. 
However, the literature is not consistent in the support whether the stimuli 
material must be self-referential. Moritz et al., (2005) used only four DRM 
lists when they examined mood congruent true and false recognition, thus 
narrowing the range of depressive preoccupations. The lists did not differ 
regarding associative strength and word length, but it may have differed in 
other aspects. The present study used multiple lists of both depression-
related and neutral, to eliminate this concern. 
 In the literature, smaller effect for recognition of emotion-related words is 
somewhat «old news». The smaller effect may have to do with the 
emotional distinctiveness of the depressive-related words. Pesta, Murphy, 
and Sanders (2001) show that participants misremembered neutral lures 
more often than they did emotional lures. In general, this indicates that 
emotional critical lures are subject to false remembering in the DRM task 
but at a lower rate then neutral critical lures. In the present study we found 
no significant effect, but this may be due to other factors, like statistical 
power, that will be explained below. 
One interesting question is whether this subjectively vivid encoding also 
corresponds with a reduction in memory distortion (Schacter, Gallo, & 
Kensinger in press). This hypothesis seems to be supported in a number of 
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studies. For example, participants who studied a list of words 
orthographically associated with a nonpresented lure word, were less likely 
to falsely recall or to falsely recognize the lure word if it was emotional (e.g., 
to endorse rape after studying cape, nape, tape) than if it was neutral (e.g., 
hook after studying book, look, cook; Pesta et al., 2001). Manipulations in 
distinctiveness were also related to this, like including other emotional items 
at encoding (thereby decreasing the distinctiveness of the emotional lure 
words) increased the likelihood of false recognition (Pesta et al., 2001). 
Overall, these results supports that individuals can use the distinctiveness 
provided by emotion to reduce their rates of false recognition (Schacter et 
al. in press). The majority of the studied items were in these studies neutral, 
so Schacter et al. (in press) warned that the emotional lures may have been 
rejected due to their conceptual incongruence with the studied item instead 
of specific effects of emotion. In the current research there were equal 
numbers of depressive-related and neutral words/lures. Anyway, we do not 
know if the participants interpret them in the same way. Hence, we do not 
know whether it was emotion that triggered that depression only correlated 
with false recognition for neutral critical lures and not depressive-related 
due to the distinctiveness provided by emotion, or if it was other factors that 
affected. 
5.1.2 Statistical Power
Another possible explanation for the absence of false recall for depression 
on the depressive-related critical lures may be the statistical power. The lack 
of significant correlation between depression and false recognition for 
depressive-related critical lures can be attributed to the relatively small 
number of participants displaying high scores on the BDI questionnaire 
(n=15, of whom 2 scored in the serious depressive range). To comparison, 
the sample size of participants displaying higher degrees on the BAI 
questionnaire where major (n=26, of whom 5 scored in the serious anxiety 
range). The subclinical levels of depression may not have been sufficient to 
result in significant memory deficiencies for depressive-related critical lures. 
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However, small sample sizes in depression and false memories studies is 
not rare, and may be due to the difficulty in collecting data from individuals 
with depressive symptoms. 
5.2 Anxiety and the False Memory Effect
Surprisingly, while depression only correlated with neutral critical lures, was 
anxiety related to false recognition of both neutral and depressive-related 
critical lures. Anxiety is like depression associated with cognitive 
performance deficits, including those involving memory (e.g. Mueller, 1992). 
As noted before, Zoellner et al. (2000) found that false recall was related to 
trait anxiety. Like depression, source monitoring was one theory for false 
memory creation with anxious individuals. Despite that we designed DRM 
lists for depression-related words resulted this in a significant false 
recognition only for anxious participants. 
5.2.1 Anxiety-Related Instead of Depression-Related?
One explanation for the significant correlation between anxiety and false 
recognition for depression-related lures can be that the DRM lists were more 
anxiety-related than depressive-related. In hindsight, several of the lists 
were anxiety-related with critical lures like worried, shame, sleep, future, 
success, problem and health. Depression is associated more with past 
events than future events, whereas the opposite is true for anxiety 
(Eysenck, Payne, & Santos, 2006). The hypothesis that anxiety is associated 
with danger events, whereas depression is associated with loss events has 
received reasonable support (Eysenck et al., 2006). One assumption is 
therefore that the depression-related words were more triggering to the 
anxious than the depressive participants because the depression-related 
DRM lists may be associated with more future, threatening events.
There are, however, other theories than source-monitoring framework that 
is put forth to address this question. One theory proposed by Eysenck & 
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Calvo (1992) postulates that anxiety affects information processing in two 
quite different ways. For example, worry may elicit task-irrelevant cognitive 
activity and therefore consumes anxiety processing resources within 
working memory (Baddeley, 1986). Moreover, their concern to avoid poor 
performance motivates anxious individuals to invest greater effort in task 
performance to compensate for their capacity limitations (Macleod & 
Mathews, 2004). This may lead anxious individuals to perform as well as, or 
even better than, nonanxious individuals if the task is not too demanding 
(Macleod & Mathews, 2004). On the other side, if a task places high 
demands on temporary storage capacity, performance of anxious 
participants likely suffers (Macleod & Mathews, 2004). 
Several studies (e.g. Darke, 1988) have supported these predictions. 
Participants with high levels of anxiety are more likely than nonanxious to 
let threatening words hold their attention (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). This can result in worse memory if attention 
to threat during encoding results, for example, principally in registration 
only of aversive quality of the feelings evoked, then the may be fewer 
distinctive features within the memory representation to help in later recall 
(Macleod & Mathews, 2004). This may also give the opposite effect; if 
attention to threat during encoding is accompanied by subsequent 
processing of the distinctive meaning of the emotional information, then its 
later recall is likely to be enhanced (Macleod & Mathews, 2004). In the 
current study, the depressive-related words perhaps was experienced as 
threatening for the anxious participants and this elicited task-irrelevant 
cognitive activity. Moreover, this is followed by poorer memory for these 
words and susceptibility for false recognitions.    
5.3 Depression and Anxiety – Distinct Conditions? 
Like previous research has revealed, the findings of depression, anxiety and 
susceptibility to false memory creation have been various and diffused. 
There may be several reasons for these inconsistent results. The existence 
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of «pure» depressive states may be quite rare, and still we do not 
understand the frequency and diagnostic significance of comorbid 
conditions (Clark et al., 1999). Comorbidity can be referred to as high rate of 
coexistence with other types of psychiatric condition or disease (Clark et al., 
1999). Depression and anxiety have received most empirical attention; 
roughly 50% of clinically depressed or anxious individuals may have a 
coexisting anxious or depressive disorder (L.A Clark, 1989). High 
correlations between measures of anxiety and depression has been shown 
in several studies, and some researchers argues that these symptom 
measures do not assess distinct anxiety and depression construct but rather 
a single common general distress or negative affect dimension (e.g., 
Feldman, 1993). 
Some authors have earlier warned that high BDI scores may not indicate 
depression, because depression is highly correlated with other measures of 
psychopathology in these groups (Gotlib, 1984; Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 
1986). In students groups, high BDI scores may represents diffuse 
maladaptive functioning, or transient negative affect, instead of depressive 
psychopathology (Sacco, 1981). Therefore, college students with high BDI 
scores may present a higher number of false-positive depression diagnoses 
than a clinical sample. Following this reasoning, it can be argued that the 
depressed participants in the current study also displayed high scores on 
anxiety and reverse, and it also may be high false-positive scores that do 
not display depression. 
On the other hand, studies have also shown that self-reports measures like 
the BDI and BAI can distinguish between depression and anxiety (e.g., D.A 
Clark, Beck & Stewart, 1990; Cox, Swinson, Kuch, & Reichman, 1993). 
Moreover, in the current study we used the revised BDI-II, where research 
show that the content validity has been improved by following DSM-IV 
criteria (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996). 
The overlap in many of the symptoms that defines depression and anxiety 
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can be one reason for the high comorbidity as well as the high correlation 
anxiety and depression symptom measures (Brady & Kendall, 1992). 
Common and distinct symptoms of depression and anxiety, is up to this 
date unsure. Some research has shown that symptoms such as irritability, 
restlessness, difficulty concentrating, insomnia, crying, general distress, 
decreased activity, poor social skills, helplessness, worry, and low self-
efficacy have been considered as common to both disorders (Alloy, Kelly, 
Mineka, & Clements, 1990; L.A. Clark, 1989). Depression is distinguished by 
symptoms such as loss of pleasurable engagement with the environment, 
disinterest, low motivation, and social withdrawal (Watson & Kendall, 1989), 
and physiological arousal specific to anxiety (LA. Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 
1994). However, these findings have not been supported in all research 
(Clark et al., 1999). The comorbidity of anxiety and depression is an 
important issue for the present study; we ideally want to investigate them 
separately. Hence, it is difficult to conclude from the present results whether 
the false memory effect is affected by depression, anxiety or maybe both.   
Another perspective is that viewing individuals with depressive symptoms 
as a single group, one is courting greater variability in performance scores 
due to the general variance in depressive core symptomatology (Kizilbash, 
Vanderploeg & Curtiss, 2002). For example, depressed individuals may or 
may not exhibit sleep abnormalities, reduced appetite, hopelessness, 
helplessness, psychomotor retardation, or even depressed mood itself 
(Kizilbash et al, 2002). These interindividual differences, in addition to the 
normal variation of cognitive abilities, tend to enhance the variance of test 
scores more so than normal populations (Veiel, 1997).   
In summary, it is possible that the observed difference between anxiety and 
depression were not significant because the methodology used to identify 
depressive or anxious mood was not stringent enough.   
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5.3.1 The Effect of Co-Existing Depression and Anxiety 
So, what happens to false memory when depression and anxiety coexist? 
The present study did not explore that question. However, there are studies 
that suggest that those experiencing high levels of co-existing depression 
and anxiety are more likely to have immediate and delayed memory 
difficulties than individuals reporting either depressive or anxious symptoms 
alone, or those with low levels of both (Kizilbash et al., 2002). The 
uncertainties raised by previous research on depression and false memory 
effect may be clarified of these findings. The present result found 
correlation with both anxiety and depression, Brennen et al. (in press) that 
found a correlation between depression and false memory creation, whereas 
Zoellner et al. (2000) found anxiety instead of depression. Perhaps these 
inconsistent results may be due to this comorbidity, indicating that 
individuals with coexisting depressive and anxiety symptoms are prone to 
false memory effect. Future studies should address these additional 
questions that were not explored within the framework of the present study. 
For example, if co-existing anxiety and depression are more prone to the 
false memory effect than individuals reporting depressive or anxiety 
symptoms alone, or those with low levels of both, this could have significant 
impact for understanding these disorders.   
5.4 Depression, Anxiety and Mood Congruency Effect
As outlined before, if we present positively and negatively affective words in 
a first experimental task and later the participants have to recognize those 
words (see the meta-analysis by Matt, Vàzquez & Campell, 1992), chances 
are good that recall will in some way be congruent with mood. In line with 
several recent studies, the present study did not find any significant 
correlation for mood congruency effect, predicting that depressed 
participants display superior memory performance of depression-related 
material relative to neutral material. There may be two assumptions when 
interpreting these results. First, the depressive-related DRM lists may not 
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been so depressive-related after all. As described above, the content of 
stimuli may be labeled as sad, unpleasant or negative, but perhaps not 
specifically depressive that is needed for the self-referent encoding of 
stimuli. 
Research has also shown the opposite effect with dysphoria. Dysphoric 
individuals have shown a more balanced recall of affectively toned stimuli, 
where they recalled fewer positive words, but the same number of negative 
words as nondysphoric individuals do (Matt et al., 1992). Balanced recall 
can be explained in a more general phenomenon labeled as depressive 
realism, which implies that subclinically depressed participants have a more 
realistic view of their environment and are less sensitive to perceptual and 
judgmental biases than normal nondepressed persons (Matt et al., 1992). 
Our results are not statistically significant, but support these findings. The 
present study employed a recognition task, more studies have used free 
recall procedures and this may be a more robust method for eliciting the 
mood congruency effect (Matt et al., 1992).      
As suggested, BDI may not measure only depression but also other 
psychopathology. The second assumption, in the case of mood congruency 
effect, is that higher BDI scores do not identify a negative mood or positive 
mood, as the specific component associated with differential recognition. In 
the present study we just assume that a higher BDI score is related to a 
negative mood. This explains, however, not the absence of mood-
congruency effect if high BDI scores reflect transient negative affect rather 
than depression. Mood-congruent effect is often obtained in non-clinical 
samples through mood induction manipulations. If high BDI scores reflect 
false-positive scores without this implying a negative affect, this may 
explain the absence of mood congruency effect.    
The absent mood-congruency effect suggest three possible scenarios. First, 
the DRM lists were perhaps not self-referent enough to trigger it. Secondly, 
it is possible that higher degrees in BDI measurement did not reflect 
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negative mood in participants that obtained high scores in this measure. 
Third, the result is consistent with the depressive realism that earlier 
research has observed in dysphoric patients. Further, we do not know 
whether negative mood and depression are distinct constructs. If so, then 
BDI may be appropriate to study the question of depression-related deficits 
in memory, but inappropriate to study the question of mood-congruent 
memory bias. In addition to BDI should there be more information on mood, 
this applies to most studies that use depressed mood (both clinical and 
subclinical) and mood induced studies. 
 
As noted, anxious participants remembered neutral words significant better. 
This is interesting in circumstance to the previous described theory of 
information processing with anxious individuals by Eysenck & Carvo (1992). 
As this theory postulates, worry can motivate anxious individuals to perform 
even better than nonanxious, if the task is not too demanding. In fact, this 
can be a possible explanation for why anxious individuals correctly 
remembered significantly more neutral words, and why this possible mood-
congruency effect did not occur on depressive-related words. When anxious 
studied neutral words, these could be experienced as a non threat, and thus 
did their possible concern for poor performance affected them to 
concentrate and remember more. However, when attention to threat 
stimuli, like the depression-related words, worry may elicit task-irrelevant, 
over-activated cognitive activity and this may result in poorer memory.  
6. Conclusion
In this paper we used the most common laboratory technique for eliciting 
false memories and explored whether depression, anxiety, fantasy 
proneness or dissociation make people more prone to the false memory 
effect. Our most important finding was the effect of anxiety for false 
recognition of both depressive-related and neutral critical lure, whereas 
depression only correlated for neutral lures.   
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As postulated, increased susceptibility to false memory effect may be due to 
a deficit in source monitoring. In the literature, several researchers argue 
that the DRM procedure can be conceived as a source monitoring task (e.g., 
Schacter, Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996). If so, the present results indicates 
that participants with depressive or anxious symptoms (or maybe both!) 
may have a general source monitoring deficit. Other source monitoring 
paradigms should be used to explore this closer. Future research should also 
explore source monitoring in relation to anxiety-related and depressive-
related material, in addition to more depression measurements as clinical 
interview. It would be very interesting to study false memory in relation to 
coexisting anxiety and depression. 
As presented in the introduction, it is important to note that the present 
results should not be misinterpreted to suggest that anxious individuals are 
more susceptible to generate false memories for negative events 
themselves. However, it was speculated that the false memory creation with 
depressive and anxious individuals could explain the development and 
maintenance of the affective disorder- in line with the hypothesis derived 
from Beck's cognitive theory. The fact that individuals with depressive and 
anxiety symptoms possess a number of false recognition on the DRM task 
does, however, not in and it self demonstrate that this approach is of value 
in producing and understanding anxiety and depression. Finding that 
individuals with higher scores on depressive measurement, such as BDI, or 
anxiety measurement, such as BAI, simply says that highly depressive, 
anxious individuals are more likely to have false memory bias, is 
correlational evidence. Actually, it may reflect the impact of high 
depression/anxiety on cognitive processing rather than reverse. 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) suggested that false memory effect that 
are achieved in a relative simple, intentional learning task with immediate 
recall, then this phenomenon may be even more pronounced in real-life 
settings. The issue of whether laboratory studies should be generalized to 
real world’s settings is an important question. However, a wide range of 
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false memory research has advanced our understanding of false memories 
in the real world. Wade et al. (2007) make an important note when 
remaining that psychological science as other scientific domains tries to 
understand behavior from the real world by bringing it into the laboratory, 
not the other way around.     
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Appendix: The 20 10-words lists and their critical items.
Depression-related lists  Neutral lists
Trist Bekymret Frukt Brød
Alvorlig Engstelig Plommer Mat 
Gråt Urolig Grønnsaker Smør
Deprimert Rådvill Appelsin Loff
Matt Ubesluttsom Syltetøy Spise
Ulykkelig Pessimistisk Dessert Melk
Nedstemt Følsom Bananer Skive
Bedrøvelig Skvetten Blåbær Kniv
Lei Skjelven Kirsebær Korn
Melankolsk Svett Juice Kake
Håpløst Plage Salat Ost
Skam Sove Kaldt Føtter
Flau Trøtt Varmt Tå
Skyld Drømme Snø  Kroppsdeler
Usikker Seng Vinter Skolisser
Angre Hvile Is Sparke
Rødme Dyne Våt Sandaler
Unnskyld Sliten Kjølig Sokker
Aksept Leggetid Vær Jogge
Ynkelig Snorke Fryse Ankel
Ydmyk Mareritt Frost Lukt
Sosial Våkne Rim Fotball
Fremtid Lykkelig Musikk Hus
Håp Glad Toner Hytte
Planer Smil Noter Hjem
Drømmer Latter Piano Bolig
Mål Entusiastisk Sangstemme Hage
Ambisjoner Henrykt Radio Villa
Lyst Positiv Band Tak
Tid Fornøyd Melodi Bo
År Flire Konsert Bygning
Svart Tilfreds Instrument Rom
Liv Vits Rytme Gård
47
Depression-related lists Neutral lists
Suksess Helse Vindu Konge
Medalje Doktor Dør Krone
Stolt Ernæring Glass Dronning
Oppnå Syk Rute Prins
Gratulasjoner Medisiner Skygge Harald
Tale Trening Karm  Statsoverhode
Venner Konsultasjon Gardiner Slott
Rik Smerte Åpent Trone
Bukett Resept Leilighet Monark
Viktig Ryggen Utsikt Sjakk
Diplom Tobakk Bris Leder
Problem Mørk Nål Lege
Krise Sort Tråd Sykepleier
Dilemma Katt Sy Syk
Gruble Natt Øye Sykehus
Overveie Vinter Skarp Pasient
Alternativer Redd Spiss Stetoskop
Handlingslammet Død Stikke Operasjon
Løsning Uhyggelig Sprøyte Klinikk
Vanskelig Skummelt Arm Medisin
Rådvill Begravelse Torn Kontor
Tenke Lys Injeksjon Kirurg
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